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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: ARE THE STANDARDS CHANGING TO
REFLECT SOCIETY'S GROWING HEALTH CARE
CONSUMERISM?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice litigation has evolved significantly in the past
two decades. This evolution is the result of a perceived health care crisis, which has stimulated increased consumerism in health care issues.
Due to this increasing consumer activism, the average health care consumer is more aware and better informed regarding health care issues.
This comment proposes that the courts' recent assessments of contributory negligence in medical malpractice actions reflect the increased
knowledge and awareness of health care consumers regarding health
care issues. This change in judicial attitude is demonstrated by the
courts' increasing reliance on patient behavior in determining the proximate cause of the patient's injury and rejection of the traditional requirement of concurrent negligence in proving contributory negligence.
The relationship between patient and physician is the basis for assessment of most medical negligence issues. The traditional model of
the physician-patient relationship is based on the assumption that the
physician has superior knowledge while the patient has little experience
and information regarding health care issues. This assumption justifies
the patient placing great trust in the physician's decision-making authority. Further, this assumption imposes a higher standard of care
upon physicians than other tort defendants. Proving contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action based on the traditional model of
the physician-patient relationship presents a difficult burden for the
physician-defendant. Aside from impediments inherent in the tort system, the unique relationship between physician and patient imposes
more stringent standards.
Traditionally, to prove contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action, the physician-defendant had to prove not only that the
plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, but also
that the negligence occurred simultaneously with that of the physician.
Further, the physician-defendant had to prove that the patient was
well-informed regarding the severity of his condition and the significance of the treatment of the condition. The requirement that a patient
exercise the degree of care expected of a reasonable person under similar circumstances is profoundly affected by the effects of disease, pain,
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disability, medication, and the disparity in the levels of knowledge of
the patient and the physician. As a result, the patient's conduct had to
be significantly unreasonable to bar recovery in medical malpractice
actions based on the traditional physician-patient relationship.
This traditional model is changing. Over the past two decades, a
perceived health care crisis has stimulated consumer activism in health
care issues. Consumers are now more involved in and aware of medical
matters. Increasing consumer awareness has had a profound effect on
the physician-patient relationship. The health care consumer is no
longer presumed to be totally uninformed and unaware of his health
care needs. Whereas the traditional physician-patient relationship was
based on the patient's blind faith in the physician's superior knowledge,
health care consumers now have higher expectations of their physicians
and exert more control in the decision-making process.
Recent judicial trends reflect this evolving model of the physicianpatient relationship through a change in the standards applied to allegations of contributory negligence. Courts appear to be more cognizant
of heightened consumer awareness of health care issues. Arguably, in
response to this increased knowledge, courts are more willing to hold
patients to a higher degree of responsibility for their own health care
decisions. A patient's refusal to exercise due care to protect his own
health needs is more likely found to be the proximate cause of the resultant harm. Accordingly, an injured patient can no longer rely on the
requirement that his own negligence take place concurrently with the
physician's negligence. Courts recognize that a patient's negligence
subsequent to a physician's negligence can substantially affect the patient's ultimate condition.
II.

TRADITIONAL ASSESSMENT

OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN

A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION

A.

Negligence in a Medical Malpractice Action

Medical malpractice is an action against a health care provider
based on the assertion that the provider failed to meet the acceptable
standards for delivery of health care.I Physicians, the health care providers most closely associated with decision-making and control, are frequently the primary focus of malpractice litigation. The most common

1. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). "Medical malpractice is legal
fault by a [health care provider]. It arises from the failure of a [provider] to provide the quality of
care required by law." Id. at 866.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6

19911

STANDARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

basis for a medical malpractice claim is negligence,2 which requires a
showing of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and harm. 3 The
burden of proving these elements is generally on the patient-plaintiff as
the party seeking relief."
The elements of negligence in a medical malpractice claim are: a
duty based on a physician-patient relationship;" a recognized standard
of care in the medical community; a failure by the physician to comply
with that standard; and a causal connection between such .failure and
the injury sustained by the plaintiff.' To prevail, the patient must prove
all of these elements. The element of causation requires that the defendant's negligence probably, rather than possibly, caused the injury.'
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense asserted by the
physician to show that the patient's negligence, rather than the physician's, was the cause of the patient's injury.8 Traditionally, a defense of
contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action was often unsuccessful due to the unique characteristics of the physician-patient relationship: the physician's superior knowledge, the patient's inexperience, and the high standard of care demanded of the physician.9
B.

Traditional Model of the Physician-PatientRelationship

When applying traditional tort concepts to medical malpractice
actions, the nature of the physician-patient relationship must be considered. One factor relevant to this relationship is its basis in "trust rather

2. Kenny v. Piedmont Hosp., 222 S.E.2d 162 (Ga. 1975). "Though judgment of the culpability . . .may be more exacting than for non-medical conduct, in the common law world malpractice is . . .part of the negligence branch of the law of torts . . . which generally concerns
itself with compensation of persons injured by or because of the negligent conduct of another."
George H. Hauck & David W. Louisell, Medical Malpractice, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BiOETHICS
1020, 1021 (1978).
3. W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
4. Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (11. App. Ct. 1984); Todd v. Eitel Hosp., 237
N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 1975).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323-24 (1.979). Liability may result from substandard care where one undertakes to render services, which he should recognize are necessary to
protect the safety of another, and his failure to exercise due care increases the other's risk of harm
or the harm is suffered because the other relied on the undertaking. Id. Section 324 recognizes
that one who takes charge of another who is helpless may be liable for bodily harm caused by
failure to exercise reasonable care to secure the other's safety while in the actor's charge or by
leaving the other in a worse position than before by discontinuing aid. Id. § 324.
6. Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 1976); see also Kosberg v. Washington
Hosp. Center, Inc., 394 F.2d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Almond v. Nugent, 34 Iowa 300, 301
(1872); Todd, 237 N.W.2d at 359.
7. See Newell, 466 N.E.2d at 1089; Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272
N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971); Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ohio 1938).
8. See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 87-142 and accompanying text.
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than on the monetary considerations evident in the more typical business transaction." ' 10 Since a patient is expected to place his full trust in
a physician, he is not expected to question his physician's advice.1" A
patient's justified reliance on a physician's judgment results in a higher
standard of care being applied to defendants in medical malpractice
actions than is applied to defendants in other tort relationships. 2
Further, since health care is such a complex and mercurial science, each technological development affects the appropriate and accepted standard of medical care.1 3 A physician must remain fully informed of the current state of technology to meet acceptable standards
of professional care. 4 Failure to remain informed of technological
changes affects the physician's performance relevant to the accepted
standard of care, and violates the trust the patient places in the
physician.
The practice of medicine requires extensive education and experience. The physician's superior knowledge of medical matters justifies
holding her to an exacting standard of care." There is an "apparent
belief that [medical] professionals should be measured by a higher
standard of performance than others. Where lives and health are
clearly at stake, acts of medical negligence . . . tend to shock the public conscience to an even greater degree than do similar acts of other
professionals."' 6

10. George J. Annas, Patient'sRights Movement, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcs 1201,
1201 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1988). The physician-patient relationship permits patient reliance on the physician's advice. It is not contributory negligence or
assumption of risk to rely on the physician's advice without distrusting the physician or checking
with other physicians. Id. at 1388; see also Lawrence v. Wirth, 309 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1983). "Due
to the great disparity in medical knowledge between doctor and patient, the patient is entitled to
rely upon assurances made by the doctor ....
" Lawrence, 309 S.E.2d at 317 (citation omitted).
12. See, e.g., Bird v. Pritchard, 291 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio 1973). The court noted that " 'the
general rules relating to contributory negligence must be sharpened considerably when applied to
medical malpractice cases.' " Id. at 772 (quoting Flynn v. Stearns, 145 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J. 1958)).
13. See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1982). The defendant used
the accepted standard of care in administering oxygen to a premature infant. The court held that
the physician could not be freed from liability for adhering to the accepted standard of care when
sufficient studies had been published to indicate that the accepted standard of care was no longer
the most appropriate method of treatment. Id. at 879.
14. See generally Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560-65 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
15. See, e.g., Martineau v. Nelson, 247 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Minn. 1976). In an action for
medical malpractice and breach of warranty alleging a physician's negligence, different doctors
had given conflicting opinions as to the effectiveness of a procedure. Id. The jury found each party
50% negligent. Id. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff could not be held equally negligent
with the physicians since the negligence involved interpretation of medical matters about which
doctors owe a greater duty than a patient owes to himself. Id. The superior knowledge and skill of
the physicians should have been reflected in complete and accurate advice, and the patient should
not be denied recovery because she could not distinguish appropriate from inappropriate advice.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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Courts traditionally relied on the physician's extensive education
and the high standard of care to understand the great degree of trust a
patient places in the physician's decision-making authority. 17 Patients
have been presumed to have limited experience, maturity, knowledge
and appreciation of health care issues.18 Courts relying on the traditional physician-patient relationship emphasized the fact that the patient was unlikely to have any special knowledge of his illness and thus,
relied on the physician's superior knowledge.1 9
To maintain a defense of contributory negligence, the courts required the physician to show that the plaintiff was well-informed and
aware of the significance of his condition and the relevant treatments of
the condition.2" Courts were unwilling to acknowledge that the health
care consumer could be generally well-informed of health care issues.
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that:
[I]n discussing contributory negligence in medical malpractice cases,
courts have noted the disparity between the knowledge *and skill of a
doctor and that of a patient. The patient is not in a position to diagnose
his own ailment. Without being told, he does not know the risks of medication. He is not in a position to judge whether the prescribed course of
treatment is in his best interest. As a consequence, it is not contributory
negligence for a patient to follow a doctor's instructions or rely on his
advice. 2
Considerations of the specialized knowledge of physicians and the presumed limitations of patients' awareness of health care issues, therefore, contribute to the high standards of care attributed to physicians.2"
A factor related to the high standards of care attributed to physicians is the nature of the harm which results from negligent conduct in
a physician-patient relationship. Compensation for non-economic harm

17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Wirth, 309 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1983). A physician failed to diagnose
a malignancy in a patient's breast, but advised the patient to return if any further changes were
noted. The court held that the patient was justified in her delay in seeking medical care when the
size of the breast lump increased because she was frightened by the possible diagnosis of cancer
and trusted the judgment of the physician. Id. at 318.
18. Morrison, 407 A.2d at 567-68.
19. Martineau, 247 N.W.2d at 417 (superior knowledge and skill of physician should have
been reflected in complete and accurate advice); Lawrence, 309 S.E.2d at 318 (patient justified in
relying on physician even though symptoms should have given notice of potential problems).
20. See, e.g., Martineau, 247 N.W.2d at 416-17 (contributory negligence not appropriate
since no evidence indicated that the patient was aware of the risk); see also Sawka v. Prokopowycz, 306 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
21. Santoni v. Moodie, 452 A.2d 1223, 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (citations omitted).
22. John 0. Beahrs, Legal Duties of Psychiatric Patients, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 189, 190 (1990); see also Morrison, 407 A.2d at 567-68.
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is more ambiguous than compensation for economic injury.2 3 "Damages are often rough approximations."' 24 This phrase is exemplified by
the difficulties juries have in determining the appropriate compensation
for the loss of a limb or an eye.2" Due to the emotional and sympathetic
nature of the injury and the desire to afford some compensation to the
injured party, courts are willing to find that negligence exists where no
actual proof of fault is found.26
Another burden the physician-defendant must confront derives
from the general tort concept that a plaintiff must be capable of exercising the care of a reasonable 'person in similar circumstances.2 7 The
reasonable person standard is particularly at issue in a medical malpractice action because patients are frequently in compromised circumstances due to sedation, mental incapacitation, or physical condition. 8
"A usually intelligent, rational person may lose all of his rationality
and most of hissense when he becomes ill." 29 Thus, factors relevant to
the traditional* physician-patient relationship, including the superior
knowledge attributed to the physician, the patient's perceived justified
reliance on that superior knowledge, the emotional nature of a medical

23. Hauck & Louisell, supra note 2, at 1021-22.
24. Id. at 1022.
25. Id.
26. Id. Res ipsa loquitur is one example of .the courts' efforts to compensate injured patients. Res ipsa loquitur translates to "the thing speaks for itself." Id. The doctrine is utilized
where the plaintiff is unable to prove the causation of the injury, but the injury is one that could
only occur from the malpractice or negligence of specific defendants. KEETON et al., supra note 3,
§ 39. It creates a rebuttable presumption that malpractice was committed by requiring the defendant to show that malpractice was not committed. Id. § 40; see, e.g., Lair v. Lancourt, 734
S.W.2d 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). But see Mulcahy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) (reasoning that application of res ipsa loquitur in
questionable situations is an abuse of the tort system, spreading the ultimate damages to all health
care consumers). For further information on res ipsa loquitur, see KEETON et al., supra note 3, §§
39-40. For another example of the court bending accepted legal principles to compensate injured
patients, see Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d I (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) (shifting
the burden to the defendant doctors to show non-negligence).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Clark v. Piedmont Hosp. Inc., 162 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (barring a defense of contributory negligence against an elderly patient who fell getting out of bed due
to old age and illness); Simpson v. Davis, 549 P.2d 950, 957 (Kan. 1976) (refusing to apply the
defense of contributory negligence to a conscious but partially anesthetized patient); Steele v.
Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187, 198 (Mo. 1959) (refusal of treatment due to pain and sedation not
contributory negligence).
29. Angela Holder, Contributory Negligence-Part 3, 218 JAMA 1109, 1109 (1971); see
also Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. 1988) (holding that "a mentally disturbed plaintiff is not capable of adhering to a reasonable person's standard of self-care, but . . . that plaintiff
[is] responsible for the consequences of conduct that is unreasonable in light of the plaintiff's
capacity"); Rogers v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 651 P.2d 672, 676 (Okla. 1982) ("hospital must
take into account the physical and mental condition of patients on an individual basis").
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injury, and the compromised state of many patients, resulted in a
higher standard of care being applied to physicians' conduct. 30
C. A Medical Malpractice Claim Based on the TraditionalModel of
the Physician-PatientRelationship

1. The Element of Causation
Distinguishing between the negligence of the physician and the
contributory negligence of the patient is ultimately a question, of.causation. Causation is one of the most complex and difficult elements to
comprehend in a tort action. Understanding causation is particularly
difficult in a medical malpractice action because a medical negligence
claim generally involves several unique issues: a pre-existing illness or
injury; alleged negligence of a physician; and some degree of responsibility on the part of a patient for self-care following the intervention of
the physician. It is sometimes difficult to separate these factors for purposes of determining the proximate cause of the patient's injury.31
Determination of causation in contributory negligence in a medical
malpractice action depends upon the application of the following doctrines: proximate cause; contributory and comparative negligence; and,
less significantly, the doctrines of assumption of risk, avoidance of the
consequences, and last clear chance. The following subsections will
briefly describe the elements of each of these doctrines.
32
a. The Doctrine of Proximate Cause
To analyze a claim of contributory negligence, courts must consider the causation of injury, and more specifically, the proximate causation of injury. 33 Proximate cause is defined as " 'any cause which in
30. Leslie J. Miller, Comparalive Negligence, 248 JAMA 1443, 1444 (1982).
Courts have often been reluctant to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence because it
can preclude recovery by a person whose negligence is substantially less than that of the
person being sued. This is particularly true in professional liability actions due to the great
disparity in medical knowledge between the patient and the physician. Thus, the defense of
contributory negligence has been successful mainly in cases where the patient's conduct
shows flagrant disregard for his own health or safety.
Id.
31. Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901 (Iowa 1976) (applying the substantial factor test and
requiring that it appear more probable than not that, had the physician exercised due care, the
treatment would have been a success and the injury avoided).
32. For further information on proximate cause, see KEETON et al., supra note 3, §§ 41-45.
33. Bird v. Pritchard, 291 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
Contributory negligence is not a defense in an ordinary tort action unless that negligence is
a direct and proximate cause of the injury received . . . .[F]or contributory negligence to
defeat the claim of the plaintiff, there must be not only negligent conduct by the plaintiff
but also a direct and proximate causal relationship between the negligent act and the injury plaintiff
received. 1991
Published
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the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the
result would not have occurred.' "I Proximate cause implies that the
injuries would not have occurred without the conduct of the actor.3 5
It is necessary to distinguish contributory negligence from proximate cause. 36 Although a finding that the patient's conduct was a proximate cause of the injury is necessary to establish contributory negligence, proximate cause alone is not sufficient. 7 It also must be
established that the causal relationship was the product of the patient
disregarding his duty to act reasonably in regard to his own health and
well-being. As a result, it is important to "make clear that the standard
of conduct required of [a] plaintiff to avoid contributory negligence [is]
that of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." 3 8
In Ayoub v. Spencer, the Third Circuit held that the district
court's jury instructions had "intertwined" the issues of contributory
negligence and proximate cause, possibly causing the jury to base its
verdict for the defendant on proximate cause "without regard for the
reasonableness of [the plaintiff's] conduct." 3 9 The court feared that the
issues had been so unclear to the jury that they may have found "contributory negligence based solely upon proximate cause."'40 To support
a defense of contributory negligence, therefore, the defendant must
show not only that the plaintiff's actions were the proximate cause of
the injury, but also that the plaintiff's conduct was so unreasonable
41
that the plaintiff's actions could be considered negligent.

34. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 153 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Fernandez v. Baruch, 232
A.2d 661 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 244 A.2d 109 (N.J. 1968)).
35. KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 41; see also Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 153. "If the injury
or loss were to occur in the absence of a physician's negligence or malpractice, then before responsibility may be visited upon the defendant the negligent conduct or malpractice must have been
shown to have been a substantial factor in causing the harm." Id. (citation omitted).
36. Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). A
new trial was ordered since the jury may have equated contributory negligence with proximate
cause. The appellate court noted that the district court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff's
failure to seek medical treatment was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, but had
failed to instruct the jury in assessing whether the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, which is a
prerequisite to contributory negligence. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (footnote omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 169 (citation omitted); see also Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 157 (N.J.
1988). "[Blefore submitting the issue to the jury, a court should carefully scrutinize the evidence
to see if there is a sound basis in the proofs for the assertion that the post-treatment conduct of
the patient was indeed a significant cause of the increased damages." Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 157.
41. Ayoub, 550 F.2d at 169. One can act unreasonably without causing harm. Conversely,
an injury may result from a reasonable act.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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b.

Contributory Negligence 42
Contributory negligence is defined as conduct by the plaintiff

which falls below the standard to which the plaintiff should conform
for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause of the
plaintiff's harm .4 Generally, the standard is that of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.4 4 It is assumed that a reasonable person will take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to
prevent personal injury.' To be contributorily negligent, a-person must
actually have been aware of or should have been aware of the risks
involved and then failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for
his own safety." Contributory negligence is a determination that the
plaintiff's negligence, combined with that of the defendant's, brought
about the plaintiff's injury. 7 Determining each party's respective level
of fault is the focus of contributory negligence litigation.4 8 Generally,
to bar recovery, the plaintiff's negligence " 'must have been an active
and efficient contributing cause of the injury; it must have been simultaneous and co-operating with the fault of the defendant, must have
entered into the creation of the cause of action, and have been an ele-

ment in the transaction which constituted it.' "9 In most circumstances, the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent."
The consequences of proving that a patient was contributorily negligent can be harsh. Even if negligence on the part of the physician is
42.

For further information on contributory negligence, see KEETON et al., supra note 3, §

65.
43. Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
44. Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 139 A.2d 235, 239 (Md. 1958).
45. Id.
[T]he law places upon one the duty of exercising reasonable care for his own protection
under any and all circumstances, but this requirement of the law is little more than what is
naturally practiced under the instinct of self-preservation. What an ordinarily prudent and
careful person would do under a given set of circumstances is usually controlled by the
instinctive urge [of one] to protect himself from harm.
Id. at 239 (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988); Baxley, 400 S.E.2d at 506.
48. Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 151. "Fault in that context meant a breach of a legal duty that
was comparable to the duty of the other actors to exercise such care in the circumstances as was
necessary to avoid the risk of injury incurred." Id.
49. Rochester v. Katalan, 320 A.2d 704, 707 (Del. 1974) (quoting 41 AM. JUR., Physicians
and Surgeons § 80 (1942)).
50. Tish v. Welter, 70 Ohio N.P. 472 (C.P. Knox 1897); see also Fall v. White, 449 N.E.2d
628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (defendant has the burden of proof for contributory negligence in medical malpractice actions). But see Robinson' & Weaver v. Gary, 28 Ohio St. 241, 250 (1876).
Where the plaintiff's case raises the issue of contributory negligence, the plaintiff may be required
to disprove that he was negligent before he can assert that the defendant was negligent. It becomes a question of fact for the jury. Id.
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proven, the traditional contributory negligence doctrine holds that any
negligence on the part of the patient completely bars him from any
recovery.5 1 It makes no "difference that one of the parties contributed
in a much greater degree." 52 To recover, the plaintiff "must not have
contributed at all." 53 These harsh consequences caused a number of
states to replace the doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence."4
Comparative Negligence5 5

c.

Comparative negligence embodies the concept of holding a plaintiff responsible for his wrongful conduct. 56 Under the comparative negligence theory, negligence by the plaintiff results in a reduction of the
plaintiff's damage award rather than completely barring the plaintiff's
recovery. 57 The doctrine of comparative negligence requires that the
trier of fact determine the relative percentage of negligence attributa58
ble to each party and adjust the damage assessment accordingly.
Generally, depending on the individual state's statute or common
law, the doctrine of comparative negligence is a complete bar to the

51.

ANGELA R. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW

302 (1978).

52.

Geiselman v. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 86, 88 (1874).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1990). Section 2315.19(A)(2)
provides in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence ... of a person does not bar the person or his legal representative
as complainant from recovering damages that have directly and proximately resulted from
the negligence of one or more other persons, if the contributory negligence . . . of the
complainant or of the person for whom he is legal representative was no greater than the
combined negligence of all other persons from whom the complainant seeks recovery.

Id.
55.

For further information on comparative negligence, see KEETON et al., supra note 3, §

67.
56. Id.
57. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988).
Comparative negligence was intended to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence but should not blur its clarity. It was designed only to leave the door open to those
plaintiffs whose fault was not greater than the defendant's, not to create an independent
gate-keeping function. Comparative negligence, then, will qualify the doctrine of contributory negligence when that doctrine would otherwise be applicable as a limitation on
recovery.
Id.
58. MILES J. ZAREMSKI & LOUIS S. GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE §
32:22 (1988). Applying this concept, where a patient is found to be liable for thirty percent of the
injury, and the physician seventy percent liable, the trier of fact would determine the total amount
of damages and subtract thirty percent from the patient's total recovery. KEETON et al., supra
note 3, § 67.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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plaintiff's recovery only if the trier of fact determines that the negligence of the plaintiff exceeds a certain percentage. 9 Also, as at common law, the plaintiff may not recover if the injury was caused solely
by his own negligence without any fault on the part of the defendant.6 0
Finally, analysis of proximate cause is as necessary for assessment of
comparative negligence as it is for contributory negligence.
d.

Assumption of Risk61

Traditionally, a defense of assumption of risk was rarely sustained
in medical malpractice actions.6 2 Assumption of risk was only appropriate where the hazards were so obvious that the patient should have
been aware of them.6 3 Although pure assumption of risk theory assumes no negligence on the part of the defendant, 4 the doctrine may
be considered in contributory negligence analysis since the plaintiff
may have deliberately and voluntarily chosen to assume the risk of
harm.6 5 Deliberate and voluntary choice implies that the patient understands the possibility of a negative result and knowingly consents to the
treatment. 66

59. ZAREMSKI & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, § 32:22. For example, under Ohio Revised
Code section 2315.19, the comparative negligence statute, when the trier of fact determines that
the plaintiff was 51% negligent,. he is barred from recovering for the 49% negligence of the
defendant. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1990).
60. Robinson & Weaver v. Gary, 28 Ohio St. 241 (1876).
61. Assumption of risk is qualified by type, which includes express, primary, and secondary.
KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 68. Secondary assumption of risk is conceptually related to contributory negligence, defined as "(1) [plaintiff's] consent to or acquiescence in (2) an appreciated or
known (3) risk." Wever v. Hicks, 228 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ohio 1967) (citation omitted). The defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff's awareness of the risk acts as a defense. The
unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff defines his negligence. Siglow v. Smart, 539 N.E.2d 636, 638
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987). Although secondary assumption of risk acknowledges the potential for
injury, it is not a consent to injury. Thus, it resembles contributory negligence, and generally
involves factual questions to be resolved by the jury. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780, 782
(Ohio 1983); see also Meistrich v. Casino Arena, 155 A.2d 1208 (N.J. 1959); KEETON et al.,
supra note 3, § 68.
62. In order for assumption of risk to apply in a medical malpractice action, all the resulting injuries must have been carefully explained to the patient. "Since most patients' knowledge of
medicine does not permit them to understand these risks, without clear proof of totally informed
consent, the defense of assumption of risk is not successful." HOLDER, supra note 51, at 310.
63. Champs v. Stone, 58 N.E.2d 803, 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944). (assumption of risk appropriate when patient allowed an obviously intoxicated physician to administer an injection); Charrin v. Methodist Hosp., 432 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968) (the patient assumed the risk
when she tripped over an electrical cord in her hospital room).
64. KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 68.
65. Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 506-07 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (although physician
negligently failed to diagnose the patient's illness, patient's failure to report obvious symptoms led
court to find that patient assumed the risk of the ultimate injury).
66. Id.
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Assumption of risk requires proof of three elements: a condition
which is "patently dangerous"; full knowledge of the condition; and
voluntary exposure to the potential harm."' The person who voluntarily
exposes himself to a known risk of harm should not be allowed to hold
another person responsible for the unwanted results of his own choice. 68
Assumption of risk in a medical malpractice action is intertwined
with the doctrine of informed consent. 9 Informed consent requires that
all the risks of treatment or lack of treatment be explained to the patient. In the absence of such an explanation, the patient's consent for
treatment cannot be considered effective. If treatment results in harm
to the patient, and such harm was not described to the patient prior to
his giving consent for the treatment, the doctrine of assumption of risk
is inapplicable.7 0 "Since most patients' knowledge of medicine does not
permit them to understand these risks, without clear proof of totally
71
informed consent, the defense of assumption of risk is not successful."
Only in rare circumstances would a patient be 72considered to have assumed the risk of negligent medical treatment.
e.

73
The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences

Traditionally, the negligence of a patient subsequent to a negligent
act by a physician would not serve as a defense for the negligent physician. 74 Generally, the patient's subsequent negligence would invoke the

67. Briere v. Lathrop Co., 258 N.E.2d 597, 603 (Ohio 1970); Siglow v. Smart, 539 N.E.2d
636, 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
68. Baxley, 400 S.E.2d at 506.
69. Faile v. Bycura, 374 S.E.2d 687 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). The concepts of informed consent and assumption of risk are easily confused. A lack of informed consent alleges that "a medical practitioner failed to inform [the patient] of the consequences of a procedure . . . .This is a
theory of liability. In such a situation, a plaintiff must normally establish a breach of the duty to
disclose by expert testimony." Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
70. HOLDER, supra note 51, at 310.
71. Id.
72. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has noted that:
In the context of medical malpractice, the superior knowledge of the doctor with his expertise in medical matters and the generally limited ability of the patient to ascertain the
existence of certain risks and dangers that inhere in certain medical treatments, negates
the critical elements of the defense, i.e., knowledge and appreciation of the risk. Thus, save
exceptional circumstances, a patient cannot assume the risk of negligent treatment.
Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555,,567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). The court
said that the same principles would apply to contributory negligence. Id. at 568 n.l I; see also
Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116 (Wash.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 827 (1985). Subsequent to a
physician's negligence, a Jehovah's Witness refused a necessary blood transfusion and died.
Shorter, 695 P.2d at 116. The court found the patient 75% negligent and the physician 25%
negligent. Where the patient may have assumed the risk of injury by refusing to accept the transfusion, she did not assume the risk of negligent treatment by the physician. Id.
73. For further information on the doctrine of avoidable consequences, see KEETON et al.,
supra note 3, § 65.
74. Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12 (1878) (negligence of the plaintiff or of another physihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
cian subsequent to that of the defendant physician will not discharge the cause of action).
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doctrine of avoidable consequences, and serve only to mitigate the
plaintiff's damages.7 Although the doctrine of avoidable consequences
may be more applicable in damage assessment than in fault evaluation,
public policy requires its consideration in evaluating a claim of contrib76
utory negligence.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences states "that a plaintiff who
has suffered an injury as the proximate result of a tort cannot recover
for any portion of the harm that by the exercise of ordinary care he
could have avoided." '77 The doctrine of avoidable consequences can be
easily distinguished from contributory negligence. The doctrine of
avoidable consequences is appropriate when the negligence of the plaintiff occurred subsequent to that of the defendant; contributory negligence requires simultaneous negligence of both. parties.78
A plaintiffs negligent conduct is not immunized by the doctrine of
avoidable consequences. It diminishes the dahmages rather than abolishing the cause-of action for negligence. 79 Where the doctrine of avoidable consequences is applicable, the person bringiig the suit is not contributorily negligent since his actions were not a proximate cause of the

75. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. 1988).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1979). The comment discusses
the doctrine of avoidable consequences:
[lI]t is not true that the injured person has a duty to act, nor that the conduct of the
tortfeasor ceases to be a legal cause of the ultimate harm; but recovery for the harm is
denied because it is in part the result of the injured person's lack of care, and public policy
requires that persons should be discouraged from wasting their resources, both physical or
economic.
Id.
77. Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 151 (citations omitted); see also Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) ("under the 'avoidable consequences rule,' [a
claimant] is required to submit to treatment that is medically advisable; failure to do so may bar
future recovery for a condition he could thereby have alleviated or avoided"); KEETON et al.,
supra note 3, § 65.
78. Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 152.
79. Id. at 154.
The doctrine of contributory negligence bars any recovery to the claimant whose negligent
action or inaction before the defendant's wrongdoing has been completed has contributed
to cause actual invasion of plaintiff's person or property. By contrast, "[tihe doctrine of
avoidable consequences comes into play at a later stage. Where the defendant has already
committed an actionable wrong, whether tort or breach of contract, then this doctrine
[avoidable consequences] limits the plaintiff's recovery by disallowing only those items of
damages which could reasonably have been averted . . . . [C]ontributory negligence is to
be asserted as a complete defense, whereas the doctrine of avoidable consequences is not
considered a defense at all, but merely a rule of damages by which certain particular items
of loss may be excluded from consideration ... "
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES ch. 5, at
127-28 (1935)).
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original injury.8" Thus, recovery is reduced to the extent that the injured person aggravated the injury81
82
f. The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Another consideration in medical malpractice is the doctrine of
last clear chance. Last clear chance requires that "a person who has
negligently placed himself in a position of danger may nevertheless recover damages if the person being sued discovered the danger while
there was still time to avoid the injury and failed to do sO.1 ' 83 For a
plaintiff to assert the last clear chance doctrine, he must show that the
defendant was aware of the plaintiff's impending harm.84 The doctrine
is not appropriate in all situations where contributory negligence is at
issue, but "only where the plaintiff's antecedent negligence has become
remote in the chain of causation and is but a mere condition of the
' 85
plaintiff's injury.
The last clear chance doctrine is distinguishable from the traditional application of contributory negligence. In the former, the plaintiff's negligence must occur prior to that of the defendant; while in the
latter, the plaintiff's negligence must occur simultaneously with that of
the defendant.88

80. KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 65.
81. Id.
82. For more information on the doctrine of last clear chance, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 479-80 (1979).
83. Miller, supra note 30, at 1443-44; see also Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 587
S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (considering but denying application of last clear chance since
the physician could not have discovered the danger while there was time to avoid the injury).
84. Johnston v. Ward, 344 S.E.2d 166, 172 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
85. Id. (quoting Smith v. Blackwell, 156 S.E.2d 867 (S.C. 1967)).
"[The doctrine of last clear chance] does not apply where the plaintiff's act combines and
concurs with the defendant's act as a proximate cause of the injury." Before the doctrine
can be applied, the plaintiff's negligence must have ceased to operate as a proximate cause
of the injury while there was still time for the defendant's negligence to intervene.
Id. at 173 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. George, 294 S.E.2d 35, 36 (S.C. 1982)).
86. Another cause of action relevant to a medical malpractice action is the loss of chance
d6ctrine. Although not related to contributory negligence, it is a significant factor in determining
damages where the patients present themselves to the physician in a compromised state. Under
the loss of chance theory, the plaintiff already has a shortened life expectancy and the defendant's
negligence has decreased the chance of survival. The burden should fall on the plaintiff to prove
what the chance was worth. If the chance was better than even, the plaintiff should probably be
fully compensated for the difference between his actual condition and his condition had the treatment been successful. However, where the chance of survival is less than even, the patient should
recover only for that chance of recovery that would have existed without the defendant's negligence. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 66. Thus, a patient with only a nine percent
chance of survival prior to the physician's negligence should be accorded damages only for value
of the lost nine percent chance of survival. See, e.g., Chester v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 458
(W.D. Pa. 1975), app'd without op., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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2. Application of Related Doctrines in a Traditional Medical Malpractice Action
Courts following the model of the traditional physician-patient relationship held only on limited situations that a patient's negligence
was a contributing factor to the injury sustained. Similarly, doctrines
such as comparative negligence and assumption of risk were narrowly
construed in a medical malpractice action. Courts developed strict
guidelines requiring a clear finding that the patient's and the physician's negligence were concurrent, and that the patient's act was the
proximate cause of his injury. The following section reviews earlier
cases, demonstrating the courts' emphasis on concurrent negligence and
proximate cause in contributory negligence analysis.
a.

Concurrent Negligence

Traditionally, the courts have rigidly held the defendant to the
burden of proving that the negligence of the patient occurred simultaneously with that of the physician. 87 When the patient's negligence occurred prior to that of the physician, analysis similar to that used with
the doctrine of the particularly susceptible victim prevented the patient
from being held liable for the resultant injury. 88 In Whitehead v.
Linkous,8" the Florida District Court of Appeals refused to give a jury
instruction on contributory negligence where a patient's intentional
overdose on medication and alcohol resulted in the patient's death.9 0
Since the patient's behavior occurred prior to the physician's negligence, the patient's conduct was not the proximate cause of the
injury.91
Similarly, if the patient's negligence occurred subsequent to the
physician's negligence, it merely added to the effect of the defendant's

87. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 110 S.E. 560 (W. Va.
1922) (explaining concurrent and subsequent negligence). "[T]o be contributory, [the] negligence
must be contemporaneous with the main fact charged as negligence, and . . . the patient's negligence after dismissal of the physician or his abandonment of the case, does not bar recovery for
the negligence of the [physician], committed before termination of the relation." Id. at 563.
88. The "doctrine of the particularly susceptible victim" suggests that the defendant must
take the plaintiff as she finds him. When a patient initially presents himself to the physician in a
debilitated condition, the physician cannot later accuse the patient of contributing to his own
injury due to that debilitated condition. See. e.g., Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 149 (N.J.
1988). "[A] physician must exercise the degree of care commensurate with the needs of the patient as she presents herself. This is but another way of saying that a defendant takes the plaintiff
as she finds her." Id.
89. 404 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
90. Id. at 379-80.
Id.
Published91.by eCommons,
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negligence, and was considered under the doctrine of avoidable consequences rather than under the doctrine of contributory negligence. 92 In
this situation, the patient's negligence was not considered the cause of
his injuries, and thus, did not relieve the physician of liability. Subseserved to decrease the amount
quent negligence of the patient merely
93
of damages available to the patient.
In Sawka v. Prokopowycz," for example, the patient, complaining
of respiratory problems, refused to quit smoking on the physician's instructions.95 Although the physician failed to diagnose cancer, he instructed the patient that smoking would exacerbate the condition.96
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the patient was not contributorily negligent since his conduct was not concurrent with that of the
physician, and thus not the proximate cause of the injury. 97
It could be assumed that only in limited instances would a defense
of contributory negligence be appropriate in a medical malpractice action. "Negligence concurrent with medical treatment is extremely unusual, because the patient is usually inactive at that time." 98 One rare
example where the patient's negligence was contemporaneous with that
of the physician occurred in Champs v. Stone.99 The Ohio Court of
Appeals found a patient to be contributorily negligent when he allowed
an obviously intoxicated physician to administer an injection.100 In
most circumstances, however, the burden imposed upon the physician
of showing that the patient's conduct occurred simultaneously with the
physician's negligent act is rarely met.
b.

Proximate Cause

Narrow construction of the doctrine of proximate cause is the second guideline developed by courts following the model of the traditional
physician-patient relationship. This narrow construction led courts to
find that a patient's own negligence was a contributing factor to his
injury in only limited situations.
This subsection considers those circumstances in which a court following the traditional model of the physician-patient relationship most

92. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
93. See, e.g., Beadle v. Paine, 80 P. 903 (Or. 1905). Failure to follow the physician's advice
subsequent to negligent treatment "could only serve to mitigate the damages ... but not to relieve against the primary liabilit;'." Id. at 906.
94. 306 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
95. Id. at 357.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. HOLDER, supra note 51, at 302.
99. 58 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944).
100. Id. at 805.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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often found contributory negligence on the part of a patient. These situations occurred where the patient failed to follow the physician's instructions," 1 refused suggested treatment,"' or gave false, incomplete,
or misleading information concerning symptoms. 03 Even in these limited situations, courts were often willing to distinguish the circumstances in order to deny a defense of contributory negligence.
A patient's failure to follow a physician's advice was held to have
contributed to his ultimate injury in Stacy v. Williams. 0 4 In Stacy, the
Kentucky Supreme Court found that a patient, ignoring instructions
not to touch a newly applied cast, was contributorily negligent when he
attempted to remove a cast with a stolen table knife.10 5 Although he
was permanently disabled as a result of the injury, the patient was totally barred from recovery."0 6 Similarly, in Musachia v. Rosman,'0 '
where a patient left the hospital prior to the physician's advice, and
failed to follow dietary instructions, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the patient was solely responsible for his own death. 08 The California Court of Appeals agreed with this reasoning in Gerber v. Day,'0 9
where a physician was absolved of liability for failing to give a tetanus
anti-toxin since the patient neglected to fill a prescription for the
medication."'
Conversely, courts have also found that a patient's failure to follow
a physician's instructions did not constitute contributory negligence. In
Krauss v. Ballinger,"' the court held that where a physician is negligent, a physician is liable, even if the patient did not carry out his
instructions."' Similarly, in Heller-v. Medine,"3 the court held that a
patient's failure to follow post-operative instructions after cataract surgery (which resulted in the loss of her vision) did riot constitute contributory negligence sufficient to bar recovery. Her actions did, however, serve to mitigate her claim for damages." '
A second area where courts were willing to find contributory negligence is where the patient failed to return for recommended treatment.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

See infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
69 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1934).
Id. at 706.
Id.
190 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1966).
Id. at 50.
6 P.2d 535 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
Id. at 536.
171 II1. App. 534 (1912).
Id.
377 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (1975).
Id.
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In Jones v. Angell," 5 the Indiana Supreme Court found that a patient
was contributorily negligent for failing to return for treatment and
noted that "if he aggravates the case by his misconduct, he can not
[sic] charge to the physician the consequences due distinctly to himself."1 1 In Mecham v. McLeay, a1' a physician failed to diagnose a patient's pernicious anemia. 1 8 Following that failure, the patient refused
to follow the physician's instructions to return for further testing. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the patient was contributorily
negligent." 9
Even where the patient fails to return for recommended treatment,
some courts have avoided the application of a contributory negligence
defense. In Goettl v. Edelstein, 20 a patient was discharged from the
emergency room and died twelve hours later. The physician could not
claim contributory negligence for the patient's failure to return because, as the family testified, the patient believed she understood and
followed the physician's instructions. 21 The Ohio Court of Appeals
noted that the burden is on the physician to clearly communicate instructions and determine that the patient sufficiently understands
them.22
A third situation where courts, adhering to the traditional view of
the physician-patient relationship, have found sufficient proximate
cause to hold a patient contributorily negligent is the failure to inform
the physician of a pre-existing condition. 2 3 The courts, however, are
more likely to find contributory negligence inappropriate in this situation. The courts, in deciding the issue of contributory negligence when
the patient failed to inform the physician of a pre-existing condition,
consider whether the plaintiff knew of the importance of the omitted
information. 2 4 In these cases, courts have focused on the disparity in
the level of knowledge between the patient and physician. 2
In Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,' 2 6 the Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that a patient had no duty to voluntarily repeat

115. 95 Ind. 376 (1884).
116. Id. at 381.
117. 227 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 1975).
118. Id. at 830-31.
119. Mecham, 227 N.W.2d at 834.
120. No. CA-2218 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
121. Id. at *4.
122. Id. The couit also held that for contributory negligence to constitute a defense, the
patient's conduct "must be concurrent, direct and proximate." Id. at *5.
123. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Smith, 127 N.W. 192 (Iowa 1910) (contributory negligence was
a question for the jury when patient failed to disclose her symptoms).
124. Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 126-40.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
126. 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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her medical history to each person who treated her.' 2 7 The physician
failed to secure a medical history from the patient prior to his examining her.' 2 8 The plaintiff was referred to the defendant by her regular
physician for examination and treatment of stomach pain and fainting
spells.' 29 While under the defendant's treatment, the plaintiff fainted
and fell, sustaining the injury.' 3 0 The court held that the patient had no
affirmative duty to volunteer information relevant to her treatment.' 3 '
Because the patient lacked specialized training, she could not be expected to select and communicate to her physicians those aspects of her
medical history which were pertinent to her treatment.1 3 2 The court
found that the physician was in a far better position to elicit this information from the patient before commencing his treatment. 33
Similarly, in a wrongful death action resulting from alleged malpractice, the New York Court of Claims, in O'Neil v. State,'3 ' held
that a patient who neglected to inform a physician that she was a drug
addict was not contributorily negligent. 3 5 The physician was not relieved of liability for her death, which resulted from his failure to adequately treat her addiction, even though the patient's negligence was
contemporaneous with his.' 36 The plaintiff had been voluntarily admitted ,to a hospital for treatment of an acute barbiturate overdose. 37 The
plaintiff informed the physician that she had taken the barbiturates,
but failed to state that she was an addict.'. 38 The court found that although the patient had neglected to inform the defendant of a factor
crucial for obtaining appropriate treatment, the defendant was negligent for failing to obtain an adequate medical history. 39 The court determined that the patient relied upon the superior resources available to
the physician in ascertaining pertinent information. 4 0
In discerning the proximate cause of a patient's injury to support a
defense of contributory negligence, courts traditionally imposed a heavy
burden on the physician to show that the plaintiff was sufficiently

127. Id. at 550.
128. Id. at 549.
129. Id. at 546-47.
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id. at 550.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 323 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1971).
135. Id. at 61.
136. Id. at 61-62. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of concurrency as related to a medical malpractice action.
137. O'Neil, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
138. Id. at 61.
139. Id. at 62-63.
140. Id.
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aware of his condition. 4 1 Even where the negligence of the parties was
clearly contemporaneous, some courts persisted in denying the defense.
In O'Neil, for example, where the patient may have willfully withheld
relevant information from the physician and the negligence of each
party was clearly simultaneous, the negligence of the patient did not
constitute contributory negligence.' 2 The burden of proving contributory negligence was rarely met in courts adhering to the traditional
model of the physician-patient relationship.
D. Summary of the Traditional Model of the Physician-Patient
Relationship
Application of tort concepts to a medical malpractice action requires consideration of the unique relationship between a physician and
a patient. Factors unique to this relationship include the imprecise nature of the science of medicine, the level of education and knowledge
required to practice medicine, the presumed inexperience of the patient, the emotional nature of the injury, and the level of trust the patient is presumed to place in the physician's judgment. The physician is
assigned a high degree of responsibility for a patient's health, and this
responsibility becomes a heavy burden for a physician in a malpractice
action.
Generally, in assessing the defense of contributory negligence in a
medical malpractice action, the facts must be carefully evaluated to
determine the real and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Further, it must be shown that the plaintiff has met the elements required
for contributory negligence as determined by the state's statutes or
common law. The possibility that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury should also be evaluated. The defendant must also show that her
actions were not culpable under the particularly susceptible victim or
the last clear chance doctrines.
In assessing contributory negligence under the traditional model of
the physician-patient relationship, since contributory negligence required that the plaintiff's negligent actions be concurrent with those of
the defendant, it had to be shown that the plaintiff's conduct was
neither pre-existing nor a failure to avoid the consequences. These burdens were rarely met.

141.

See supra text accompanying notes 126-40.

142. O'Neil, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 62-63.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6

SIAVDARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Yl j

III.

171

A

CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION

A.

The Contemporary Model of the Physician-PatientRelationship
In the past two decades, there has been increasing discussion of
the "health care crisis" in the United States.' 4 3 The following factors
contribute to this "crisis":
rising costs; financial and other barriers to care; geographic maldistribution of manpower and facilities; overspecialization of providers; overutilization of hospitals; deficiencies in quality and control; a tendency, particularly among physicians, to stress the unusual at the expense of the
commonplace; barriers to provider-patient communication; training and
educational programs and research undertakings that are not always directly relevant to patient needs; an emphasis on treatment rather than
prevention; and an orientation toward patients with acute, physical
problems at the expense of patients who are chronically ill or have
mental problems.144

Since health is such a vital component in societal well-being, a malfunctioning health care delivery system can easily be perceived as a
social crisis. "Where social problems exist there are usually social
movements to combat them. In the case of health care, there is a significant consumer movement.' 45
The increase in health care consumerism implies that individuals
are more involved and aware of health care issues. 4 6 The growth of
health care consumerism can be attributed to rising medical costs and
the growing number of alternatives available to patients. Rising costs
and expanding choices increase patients' expectations of both the
health care system and the individual -provider., 7 These expectations,
143.

STEVEN JONAS, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-5 (1981).
144. Id. at 5.
145. PATRICIA A. HAMILTON, HEALTH CARE CONSUMERISM 148 (1982). One consumer advocate group is the Health Research Group, which has "researched and publicized the interests of
consumers in nutrition, unnecessary surgeries, occupational health, costs of health care, and many
other issues. This organization has offered testimony before numerous congressional committees
and has served as a technical resource on matters of health care from the consumer perspective."
Id. at 153-54.
146. In 1970, the National Welfare Rights Organization drafted the first comprehensive
statement of patients' rights, which compiled consumer demands and expectations of the health
care system. Annas, supra note 10, at 1202. In 1972, The American Hospital Association (AHA)
drafted a Patient's Bill of Rights, "[biased on the premise that '[the] traditional physician-patient
relationship takes on a new dimension when care is rendered within an [institutional] structure.' "
Id. at 1203. In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare recommended that
" 'hospitals and other health care facilities adopt and distribute statements of patients' rights in a
manner which most effectively communicates these rights to all incoming patients.' " Id. (citation
omitted).
147. Id. at 1201-02; see also ZAREMSKI & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, § 1:02.
Published by eCommons,
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coupled with increased patient awareness, diminish the perceived disparity in medical knowledge between the concerned patient and the
physician. The traditional physician-patient relationship was based on
trust, but "with the growth of knowledge and technology and higher
levels of education among the public, many physicians have difficulty in
maintaining credible claims to special status and judgment."' 4 8 The authority of the physician is eroded by increasing health care
consumerism.' 4 9
"[T]he modern patient has been able to increase his role in determining the nature of his care because of widespread and increasing
knowledge among laymen about science and recent medical advances.
In this sense, the patient becomes an intellectual partner in his own
care."' 5 ° As the patient's knowledge of technical issues grows, so does
This trend
his awareness of legal alternatives for perceived variations.
5
contributes to the rise in medical malpractice litigation.'1
B. A Medical Malpractice Claim Based on the Contemporary Model
of the Physician-PatientRelationship
While courts traditionally required physicians to meet rigid standards in proving the elements of concurrency and proximate cause to
maintain a defense of contributory negligence, recent decisions indicate
that these standards may be changing. Although physicians continue to
be held to a high standard of knowledge in medical decision-making,
health care consumers are now better educated and more aware of the
consequences of their behavior than they were in the past.' 5 2 Possibly
as a result of this trend, courts have begun to impute to patient-plain53
tiffs a higher responsibility for their own health care decisions.'

148.

David Mechanic, Therapeutic Relationship: Contemporary SociologicalAnalysis, in 4

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS

1668, 1668 (1978).

149. Id.
150. Eric J. Cassell, Therapeutic Relationship: Contemporary Medical Perspective, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1672, 1674 (1978).
151. Hauck & Louisell, supra note 2, at 1024.
152. ZAREMSKI & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, § 1:02.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 154-208. The Maryland Court of Appeals has noted
that:
[W]e may almost take judicial notice from the widespread publicity emanating from the
medical community and public health authorities, that breast cancer is a major killer of
women, that if detected early it is curable . . . . To adopt the view that it is not negligent
for women to ignore breast changes that are obvious to them would defy medical reality
and thus be absurd. But, in essence, that is the proposition urged by appellants-that the
law should excuse such negligence, however clear and egregious, provided it follows in time
some misdiagnosis or delayed or incorrect intervention by a doctor, and notwithstanding
that, but for the neglect, there would be a better-than-even chance of obtaining proper
treatment and cure. There is simply no rationality to such a view.
Chudson v. Ratra, 548 A.2d 172, 183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 894 (Md.
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Courts now recognize patients' responsibility for their own health
care needs. Only the patient can experience his own physical sensations
and only the patient can convey this experience to the physician."' The
recent movement toward viewing informed consent as a patient's right
supports the patient's active participation in the physician-patient relationship. " ' The right to participate assumes the duty to cooperate with
diagnosis and treatment to the best of the patient's ability.1" Patients'
"duty to provide information parallels physicians' duty to provide informed consent . . . . Similarly, patients' duty to cooperate parallels
the composite duty of physicians to provide diagnosis and treatment
"157

Most notably, the traditional requirement for concurrency in time
between the negligence of the physician and the patient is merging with
the concept of proximate cause. The result is a more rational assessment of causation. Recent decisions note that a patient's actions may
take effect either prior to or subsequent to those of the physician and
still be a sufficient contributing cause of the patient's injury.
In 1985, in Reikes v. Martin,15 1 the Mississippi Supreme Court
relied on the obviousness of the patient's symptoms in holding that it
was reversible error for the judge to remove the question of contributory negligence from the jury's consideration, even though the patient's
negligence occurred subsequent to that of the physician. 159 Similarly, in
1988). The plaintiff was found to be contributorily negligent based on delay in seeking further
medical treatment after she became aware that the size of a lump in her breast had increased. Id.
The plaintiff conceded that the delay in seeking medical treatment constituted negligence. She
argued, however, that negligence cannot operate to bar recovery since there was legally insufficient
evidence that the delay contributed to the spread of the cancer to the point of incurability and
lethality. In any event, the plaintiff claimed, her negligence was not concurrent with the physician's primary negligence. The plaintiff further argued that if the physician had acted properly,
the cancer could have been treated before it became lethal, i.e. "loss of chance." Id. at 176. To
establish contributory negligence, the physician met his burden by showing that the plaintiff's
negligence occurred at a time when there was still a statistical probability of cure. Id. at 177-80.
154. Fall v. White, 449 N.E.2d 628, 633-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
155. Informed consent requires that all risks of treatment or lack of treatment are explained
to the patient before that patient's consent to treatment can be considered effective. If treatment
results in harm to the patient, and such harm was not described to the patient prior to his giving
consent for the treatment, the patient is not held liable for any injury that results from that
treatment. HOLDER, supra note 51, at 310. "While disclosure of information [reduces] patients'
ignorance, it [also diminishes] the doctors' power within the physician-patient relationship." Jay
Katz, Informed Consent in Therapeutic Relationship: Law and Ethics, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 770, 777 (1978).

156. Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (I11.App. Ct. 1984).
157. Beahrs, supra note 22, at 190-91.
158. 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985).
159. The patient failed to return for a two week follow-up visit, remained in bed too long,
and did not promptly advise physicians of the formation of blisters and ulcers until the ulcers
reached a severe state and emitted a foul odor. Id. at 389.
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1988, in Chudson v. Ratra,16 0 the Maryland Court of Appeals found
that a patient's awareness of the symptoms of her illness and subsequent failure to seek treatment was the proximate cause of the injury
where such failure prevented diagnosis at a time when the illness was
curable."' 1 The court described the patient's conduct as contributorily
negligent.1 62
[T]o be contributory, the plaintiff's negligence need not always be congruent in time with the defendant's negligence. The test is not simultaneity but whether the plaintiff's dereliction has significantly contributed to
the injury for which he or she sues. Where . . . the injury does not occur
immediately upon the defendant's negligence but arises later, it is entirely possible for the plaintiff, by his or her own negligent act or omission, to contribute to the actual creation of the injury.' 3
Grippe v. Momtazee11 involved a wrongful death action 6 5 where
6
a physician failed to diagnose a breast mass as malignant.16 The plaintiff had read articles about breast masses and was aware of the consequences of failure to receive treatment. 67 Although the plaintiff was
instructed to examine her breast and return in six months, she failed to
return for nineteen months.16 8 Furthermore, she refused to see a surgeon when instructed to do so by the physician.1 69 Cancer was diagnosed when the plaintiff returned to the same physician seven months
later. 170 Discussing the physician's defense of contributory negligence,
the Missouri Court of Appeals held that:
Assuming, arguendo, that there was evidence of negligence on the part
of the doctor on the first visit in failing to discover and diagnose the
carcinoma, [plaintiff's] failure to return as instructed, rather than aggravating her damages, contributed to the very gist of plaintiff's1 7 cause of
action: the failure to diagnose the cancer prior to metastasis. 1

160. 548 A.2d 172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 894 (Md. 1988).
161. Id. at 182.
162. Id. at 183.
163. Id. at 182-83.
164. 705 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
165. Wrongful death is a statutorily created action. KEETON et al., supra note 3, § 127. The
statutes provide that a claim can be asserted for any wrongful act resulting in the death of another. Id. The action is brought for the benefit of the decedent's survivors who have suffered loss
as the result of that death. Id.
166. Grippe, 705 S.W.2d at 555.
167. Id. at 553.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 555 (footnote omitted). The court approved a jury instruction which had directed the jury to find for the defendants if they believed that the patient's negligence directly
caused or directly contributed to cause any damage she may have sustained. Id. at 556; see also
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/6
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The plaintiff's failure to return subsequent to the physician's negligence
was found to be both contributory negligence and the proximate cause
17 2
of the plaintiff's injury.
73
In 1988, an Ohio trial court in Sorina v. Armstrong,1
found that
contributory negligence barred a plaintiff's recovery because the patient, suffering symptoms of an improperly performed abortion, failed
to follow up with her physician.1 74 The Ohio Court of Appeals found
that the physician's negligence was not the actual and proximate cause
of the injury . 7 The failure to seek treatment was an intervening cause
which broke the causal connection.1 76 "[A]ppellant's own disregard for
her health proximately caused her injury. 1' 77 The court reached this
conclusion even though the parties' negligence did not occur
simultaneously.
In 1988, the Kansas Supreme Court also rejected the requirement
of concurrency in Wisker v. Hart.1 78 Wisker involved a wrongful death
action which arose from medical malpractice. Subsequent to the physician's negligence, the decedent failed to notify the physician of symptoms he experienced after engaging in physical activity which the physician had advised against. 7 9 The court considered, as a critical factor,
the time lost because of the decedent's failure to notify the physician of
his condition." The court found that the decedent's failure to inform
his physician was the proximate cause of his own injury, thereby justifying the defense of contributory negligence.1 81
Similarly, in Mackey v. Greenview Hospital, Inc.,1 82 a Kentucky
Appellate Court found that the defendant doctors and hospital were
not liable for malpractice since the plaintiff failed to inform her surgeon that she was taking a certain medication.183 During the course of

Jamas v. Krpan, 568 P.2d 1114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). In Jamas, an action for medical malpractice, the court found that an instruction on contributory negligence was justified by defense testimony. Jamas, 568 P.2d at 1115-16. The plaintiff "had been told to return to have her breasts reexamined, [she] was knowledgeable about the significance of breast lumps and [she] failed to
reveal her history of breast lumps to physicians performing subsequent examinations." Id.
172. Grippe, 705 S.W.2d at 555.
173. 554 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, No. L-89-377, 1990
Ohio App. LEXIS 4534 (Ohio Ct. App. October 19, 1990), jur. motion overruled, 569 N.E.2d
512 (Ohio 1991).
174. Id. at 945.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988).
179. Id. at 171.
180. Id. at 172.
181. Id. at 174.
182. 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
183. Id. at 257.
patient had been taking the medication Lasix. Id. at 252. "Lasix is a
Published by eCommons,The
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surgery, the plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest causing severe brain
damage due to a lack of oxygenation. 8 4 The evidence indicated that
several doctors failed to ask the patient whether she was taking medication. Further, the patient did not volunteer the information.'8 5 The
court held that although the primary responsibility for obtaining a
complete and accurate medical history from the patient is upon the
physician, the patient has a duty to use ordinary care for her own
safety. 8 The court recognized that a patient's failure to communicate
some particular aspect of her medical history would not ordinarily constitute contributory negligence. 1 87 When, however, a patient is aware
that a treating physician failed.to ascertain some aspect of her medical
history which she knew could involve a risk of harm to herself, ordinary
care dictates that she volunteer this information. 88 Since the plaintiff
failed to reveal this information, she was held to be the proximate
cause of her injury and was therefore contributorily negligent.' 89
In Schliesman v. Fisher,'9" the plaintiff claimed medical malpractice against a physician whose conduct allegedly fell below the acceptable standard of care when he discontinued the patient's diabetic medication. 9 ' The California Court of Appeals found that there was
substantial evidence from which a jury could have found that the patient was himself contributorily negligent in failing to follow his doctor's orders regarding diet, weight reduction, and medications. 92 The
court determined that such negligence could have proximately contributed to his below-the-knee amputation. 93

the risk of cardiac arrest during anesthesia. In the event of cardiac arrest, a low potassium level
can interfere with the restoration of normal heart function." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 253.
186. Id. at 255. But see O'Neil v. State, -323 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1971) (holding patient not
contributorily negligent for witholding information).
187. Mackey, 587 S.W.2d at 255.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 257. The patient was charged with this knowledge since she had taken the medication over a long period of time, and was aware that specific drugs had been used to control prior
episodes of heart problems. Id. at 256.
190. 158 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (the opinion was withdrawn by order of the
court).
191. Id. at 532.
192. Id.
193. Id. The patient failed "to follow medical advice regarding adherence to his diabetic
diet and the need for his discontinuance of beer drinking, together with his tendency to periodically stop taking his medication." Id. at 529; see also Faile v. Bycura, 374 S.E.2d 687 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding contributory negligence where a patient failed to follow a physician's orders
to wear a post-operative orthotic device).
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Courts appear more willing to allow the defense of assumption of
the risk based on the patient's knowledge regardless of the issues of
informed consent. In 1991, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in
Baxley v. Rosenblum, 94 allowed the jury to find contributory negligence and assumption of risk where the plaintiff Was also a physician.195 Theevidence indicated that the plaintiff was aware that a person with his symptoms was at risk of cancer and that "a patient takes a
serious . . . risk when he withholds information about his symptoms
and their progression." '9 6 The court noted that the plaintiff made a
voluntary decision to take the risk.' 97
Similarly, in 1986, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected
last clear chance as a cause of action in Johnston v. Ward' 9 8-- a wrongful death action arising from claimed medical malpractice.1 99 In Johnston, the patient withheld information about the specific medications
she purposely ingested in excessive amounts.2"' The omission resulted
in her death.2 01 By refusing to inform the physician of the types of
ingested medications, "[h]er negligent conduct continued until the defendants had no last clear chance to -save her . . . . [Her conduct] admits to only one conclusion: it contributed directly to her own
20 2
death.
A plaintiff's claim of last clear chance was also rejected in Rochester v. Katalan0 3 where the decedent deceived the physician as to the
decedent's medical history and symptoms, thereby inducing the physician to prescribe large doses of methadone. 204 The Delaware Supreme
Court found that the physician did not have "the last chance to avoid
the ultimate consequences . . . . Rather, it was the decedent who put
on an effective act which induced the doctor to do what the decedent
wanted .... "205 The court found that-

194. 400 S.E.2d 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
195. .d. at 507.
196. Id.
197. Id. The court also found that the plaintiff's removal of his own post-operative nasogastric tube against his surgeon's orders constituted ontributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Id. Similarly, in 1987, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Haynes v. Hoffman that a
patient may be held to assume the risk of failure to take reasonable care of himself. 296 S.E.2d
216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). A patient of sound mind who failed to disclose what he knew to be
material medical history assumed the risk of his injury. Id. at 218.
198. 344 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1986).
199. Id. at 173.
200. Id. at 168.
201. Id. at 169.
202. Id. at 173 (citation omitted). The court found it unnecessary to address the defendant's
allegations of assumption of risk, since the plaintiff was found to be contributorily negligent. Id.
203. 320 A.2d 704 (Del. 1974).
204.
Id.
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[T]he common-sense duty of a patient [is] to be truthful in describing
his symptoms to a physician to whom he looks for assistance. It is the
duty of a patient to use such care as a man of ordinary prudence would
ordinarily use in circumstances like his own, and if he fails to do this he
cannot hold the physician accountable for the consequences of his own
want of ordinary care. Wilful or intentional deception of the physician
certainly violates that rule.206
Where a court, adhering to the traditional model of the physician-patient relationship, would have found the physician responsible for ascertaining the patient's true medical condition prior to initiating treatment,20 7 the Delaware Supreme Court held a patient responsible for
the consequences of his actions.
C. Summary of the Contemporary Model of the Physician-Patient
Relationship
Recent cases illustrate that the rigid standards which courts traditionally required physicians to meet in proving the elements of concurrency and proximate cause for the defense of contributory negligence in
a medical malpractice action have relaxed. While no court specifically
addressed the changing climate of health care consumerism, it appears
that society's increased awareness of health care issues affected judicial
decision-making. "The most likely consequence of enforcing patients'
duties will be to improve the overall quality of care . . . .Collaboration and informed trust are reinforced in both parties . . . . [Platients

are held to a higher standard of communication and cooperation, and
professionals are faced with an informed and active participant. ' 20 8 In
the midst of a health care crisis, improving the overall quality of care
by enforcing patients' responsibilities for their own health care, when
appropriate, is a laudable goal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, the physician-defendant had a heavy burden of
proving contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action. To
bar-a plaintiff's recovery, the physician was required to prove that the

206. Id. at 709 (citation omitted).
[The decedent] causally contributed to his death up to the time when it occurred. Had he
informed defendants or hospital personnel that he neither was currently nor had ever been
a heroin addict (even after the original deliberately misleading statements and actions),
proper measures might have been taken to avoid potential ill effects from administration of
the methadone. It is the failure to exercise the power to correct the situation which rendered decedent's actions continuing negligence on his part.
Id. at 708.
207. See supra text accompanying note 96.
208. Beahrs, supra note 22, at 193-94.
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plaintiff's negligence was the real and proximate cause of the injury
and occurred concurrently with the physician's negligence. The requirement that a patient exercise the degree of care expected of a reasonable
person under similar circumstances was profoundly affected by disease,
pain, disability, and medication. The relationship of trust between the
physician and patient, and the great disparity presumed between the
knowledge of each, however, resulted in a nearly impossible burden for
the physician-defendant in proving that the patient was aware of the
importance of his condition and treatment. Ultimately, the patient's
conduct had to be significantly unreasonable to bar recovery.
Recent judicial trends indicate a change in the standards applied
to contributory negligence claims. The health care crisis of recent years
resulted in increased consumer activism and awareness of health care
issues. Courts appear to be cognizant of this increasing consumer
awareness and as a result are willing to hold a patient to a higher degree of responsibility for his own health care decisions. Thus, a patient's refusal to exercise due care to protect his own health needs is
more likely to be found the proximate cause of a resultant harm. Accordingly, an injured patient can no longer rely on the requirement that
his own negligence occurred concurrently with the physician's
negligence.
It appears that as health care consumers become more aware and
involved in health care issues, there will be a corresponding increase in
the degree of responsibility a patient will be required to assume in his
own health care decisions. Because the disparity between the patient's
and the physician's knowledge is diminishing, absolute trust in the physician's judgment is no longer justified in all cases. In a society concerned with health care issues, courts may increasingly demand individual responsibility for health care decisions. As noted by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, "[t]o adopt the view that it is not negligent for [patients to ignore symptoms] that are obvious to them would defy medical reality and thus be absurd."20 9
Sharon W. Murphy
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